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a b s t r a c t
In this study we elicit employers’ preferences for a variety of CV attributes and types of skills
when recruiting university graduates. Using two discrete choice experiments, we simulate
the two common steps of the graduate recruitment process: (1) the selection of suitable can-
didates for job interviews based on CVs, and (2) the hiring of graduates based on observed
skills. We show that in the ﬁrst step, employers attach most value to CV attributes which sig-
nal a high stock of occupation-speciﬁc human capital indicating low training costs and short
adjustment periods; attributes such as relevant work experience and a good match between
the ﬁeld of study and the job tasks. In line with the preferences in the ﬁrst step, employers’
actual hiring decision is mostly inﬂuenced by graduates’ level of professional expertise and
interpersonal skills. Other types of skills also play a role in the hiring decision but are less
important, and can therefore not easily compensate for a lack of occupation-speciﬁc human
capital and interpersonal skills.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The transition from university to work is a pivotal phase
in graduates’ lives. Graduates exchange the familiar world of
education for the less familiar world of work. For most grad-
uates, applying for jobs after graduation is the ﬁrst time they
get reliable information on the labour market value of their
credentials and whether their investments were worth it in
terms of getting the job they want.
Students who are concerned about their labour market
success will invest in the skills which will enable them to
take advantage of promising job opportunities. Students try
to acquire observable characteristics, such as a higher educa-
tional degree or work experience, which increase their skills
and/or reliably signal the skills they have to employers. Often,
students are faced with decisions which involve potential∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 4338882596.
E-mail address:m.humburg@maastrichtuniversity.nl,
martin.humburg@gmail.com (M. Humburg).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2015.07.001
0272-7757/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.trade-offs. For example, students who work alongside their
studies to gain work experience may ﬁnd that they lack the
time to get a high grade point average. Similarly, enrolling
in a study programme which emphasizes generic academic
skills may come at the expense of developing occupation-
speciﬁc skills.
From the individual’s perspective – but also from a higher
education policy perspective – it is important to know
which choices increase or decrease graduates’ employability
from the employers’ perspective. Knowing the preferences
which underlie employers’ selection and hiring decisions
can inform university students’ educational choices and can
enable higher education institutions to help graduates ac-
quire the skills they need to be successful in the labour
market.
Commonly, the graduate recruitment process is divided
into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, employers screen gradu-
ates’ CVs in order to decide which applicants to invite for a
job interview. During the second stage, the job interview, em-
ployers assess applicants’ skills to make a ﬁnal hiring deci-
sion. The two stages are logically related as employers can be
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and levels of skills they ﬁnd most important in the hiring de-
cision. This paper takes account of the two stage recruitment
process by investigating how graduates’ chances of getting
invited to a job interview vary with the attributes on their
CVs and how their chances of getting the job depends on the
actual skills they possess. This two stage process allows us
to make inferences about whether employers’ priorities in
the CV screening stage match their priorities in the hiring
stage.
Evidence on the value of particular CV attributes for grad-
uates’ chances on the labour market is relatively scarce.
Analysing data from graduate surveys Allen and van der
Velden (2001, 2011), and Mason, Williams, and Cranmer
(2009) ﬁnd that graduates’ chances of securing a graduate-
level job are indeed associated with observable character-
istics such as the degree, work experience, grades or study
experience abroad. However, to our knowledge our study is
the ﬁrst which systematically investigates the relative impor-
tance of CV attributes from the employer perspective using a
discrete choice experiment.
With regard to graduates’ actual skill proﬁle, there is no
consensus among researchers about which types of skills
have the highest relative importance for graduates’ em-
ployability. Especially the contrast between generic and
(occupation-) speciﬁc skills has been the subject of schol-
arly debate. While some authors emphasize the role of types
of skills transferable across jobs for graduates employabil-
ity, such as problem-solving skills, interpersonal skills, and
the ability to learn (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003; Biesma,
Pavlova, van Merode & Groot, 2007; Felstead, Gallie, Green
& Zhou, 2007; Kiong-Hock, 1986; Teijeiro, Rungo, & Freire,
2013) others point to the importance of occupation-speciﬁc,
technical skills (Elish, O’Connell & Smyth, 2010; Heijke, Meng
& Ris, 2003; Mason, 1998, 1999). Our paper contributes to
this line of the literature by analyzing data which are par-
ticularly suited for investigating the relative importance of
different types and levels of skills in the recruitment pro-
cess: we conducted two stated choice experiments – one
for each of the two recruitment stages – among 903 em-
ployers1 in nine European countries. With this method,
respondents are presented a number of vignettes with hypo-
thetical job applicants who differ in important attributes. By
asking respondents to choose the hypothetical graduate they
prefer (or none of them) they are forced to trade off some
characteristics for others. This trade-off situation simulates
a very realistic decision-making environment often missing
with standard survey questionnaires. Moreover, we use a
semi-experimental setting, thus avoiding problems of unob-
served heterogeneity that often hampers conclusions based
on cross-sectional data.
We ﬁnd that employers prefer hiring graduates with
higher levels of professional expertise – content-speciﬁc
knowledge and skills needed to solve occupation-speciﬁc
problems. Accordingly, employers’ selection of graduates for1 Note that about 25% of the respondents in our survey are co-workers in-
volved in recruitment rather than employers in the formal sense of the word
such as individuals working in general management or in human resource
departments (see Table 1). However, for convenience and comprehensibility
we will use the term ‘employer’ to denote all respondents.job interviews is most inﬂuenced by CV attributes signalling
a high stock of occupation-speciﬁc human capital, such as a
good match between the ﬁeld of study and the job tasks, and
relevant work experience. We also ﬁnd that interpersonal
skills are as important as professional expertise for gradu-
ates’ chances of getting the job.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 reviews the literature on the role of skills in gradu-
ates’ transition from university to work. Section 3 presents
the data and methodology of the study and Section 4 the
econometric model used to estimate employers’ preferences.
In Section 5 we present the results of the ﬁrst stated choice
experiment and the results of the second stated choice exper-
iment are presented in Section 6. We then draw conclusions
in Section 7.
2. Literature review and theoretical framework
Rational, proﬁt-maximizing employers hire graduates on
the basis of their human capital. Becker (1962) thinks of hu-
man capital as the stock of knowledge and skills which enter
individuals’ (and ﬁrms’) production function directly. Both
cognitive and non-cognitive skill endowments contribute to
individuals’ human capital stock and consequently to their
productivity (Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006).
When selecting candidates for job interviews, employers
face the challenge that human capital is not perfectly ob-
servable. Often, employers must rely on limited information
contained on CVs to assess the value of job applicants to the
ﬁrm. Employers will therefore exploit a correlation between
productivity and observable characteristics, such as the ob-
tained credentials and grade point averages, to make infer-
ences about applicants’ productivity. The signalling value of
the observable characteristic to employers will depend on
their demand for the type of skill associated with the sig-
nal, and the differing cost structure between high and low
skilled graduates (Spence, 1973). The greater the difference
of the costs associated with obtaining a particular credential
between low and high skilled graduates, the higher the cre-
dential’s signalling value will be.
Given the very negative social consequences for the
groups concerned, a substantial part of the literature on
employers’ use of observable characteristics as signals in
the recruitment process focuses on statistical discrimination
against particular groups of applicants, such as older appli-
cants or applicants belonging to particular ethnic or reli-
giousminorities (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Altonji & Pierret, 2001;
Arrow, 1998; van Beek, Koopmans, & van Praag, 1997;
Eriksson, Johansson, & Langenskiöld, 2012; Phelps, 1972). Our
paper deviates from this line of research in that it explores
the signalling value of credentials which are the result of
individuals’ educational or work-related investments, such
as grade point average or relevant work experience. A rela-
tionship between such credentials and graduates’ chances of
securing a graduate-level job has been found by previous
studies analysing data from graduate surveys (Allen & van der
Velden, 2001, 2011; Mason, Williams, & Cranmer, 2009) but
has never been systematically analyzed from the employers’
perspective.
In addition to examining the signalling value of CV at-
tributes, this paper investigates the relative impact different
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2 Another method which has been successfully implemented to study the
preferences of employers for applicants’ characteristics is the correspon-
dence testing methodology. With this methodology, CVs are assembled by
the researcher and sent to actual employers (e.g. Bertrand & Mullainathan,
2004). The correspondents testing methodology is a natural starting point
when attempting to elicit employers’ preferences as they have the advantage
of eliciting revealed preferences, as opposed to stated preferences. However,
their outcome variable is crude and mostly limited to call back frequencies.
Other important outcomes, such as the hiring decision, cannot be assessed.
As we are interested in the latter outcome in particular, we chose to imple-
ment the stated choice experiment methodology instead.types and levels of skills have on graduates’ chances of get-
ting a graduate-level job. Differences in the importance of
types of skills are based on the idea that economically im-
portant skills are not unidimensional and that the extent to
which skills are productive depends on the match between
workers’ skills and the requirements of the job (Hartog, 1992;
Sattinger, 1993). Graduates’ skill proﬁles differ with respect
to their emphasis on particular types of skills, such as in-
terpersonal, commercial or professional skills. Their chances
of securing the job they are applying for therefore depend
on the importance of particular types of skills these in-
dividuals have for performing the job tasks. In an analy-
sis of the demand for engineering and science graduates
in the UK Mason (1998, 1999) identiﬁes work readiness –
the knowledge, skills and commercial understanding which
make graduates deployable soon after hiring – as one of the
most important hiring criteria used by employers. In sup-
port of this ﬁnding Heijke et al. (2003) show that a high
level of ﬁeld-speciﬁc skills is positively related to gradu-
ates’ chances of ﬁnding a job which matches their ﬁeld of
study. Looking at higher education graduates’ earnings rather
than their probability of being employed, Elish et al. (2010)
ﬁnd that in Ireland technical skills generate wage returns of
around 4% while other skills, such as communication skills,
team skills or leadership skills do not have an effect on
earnings.
Other studies, however, point to the importance of inter-
personal and other transferable skills for graduates’ employ-
ability. For example, Kiong-Hock (1986) ﬁnds that Malaysian
employers put most emphasis on problem solving and af-
fective skills (personality). Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)
argue that computers substitute routine analytical and
interactive tasks but strongly complement non-routine an-
alytical and interactive tasks. They subsequently show for
the US that the declining price of computer capital in recent
decades raised the relative demand for workers who have a
comparative advantage in the ability to combine analytic and
interactive tasks. Moreover, Biesma et al. (2007) show that
for Dutch master-level graduates in the ﬁeld of public health,
problem-solving skills, creativity and interpersonal skills are
more important than ﬂexibility and public health knowl-
edge. For the UK, Felstead et al. (2007) ﬁnd that problem-
solving, communication and persuasion skills are rewarded
over and above the premium of education and train-
ing. Creating a measure of proximity between employers’
preferences for, and graduates’ attainment of, various skills,
Teijeiro et al. (2013) ﬁnd that only the proximity of systemic
skills, such as the ability to learn or the ability to work in-
dependently, inﬂuence graduates’ likelihood of employment.
In their sample, the proximity between employers’ prefer-
ences for interpersonal and instrumental skills and gradu-
ates’ attainment of these skills does not inﬂuence graduates’
employability.
Besides investigating the relative importance of different
types of skills, we also explore the effect of the skill level
on graduates’ chances of getting hired. Based on the ﬁnd-
ings of earlier studies which suggest that the occupational
production function with respect to individuals’ skill level is
concave (Borghans & de Grip, 2000; Knight, 1979), we expect
decreasing marginal returns to skills with regard to gradu-
ates’ employability.3. Data and methodology
We simulate two common stages of the graduate recruit-
ment process – the selection for job interviews and the hiring
stage – using two stated choice experiments.2
The use of stated choice experiments to estimate respon-
dents’ preferences originated in market research (Carroll &
Green, 1995; Cattin & Wittink, 1982) but is increasingly be-
ing applied in various ﬁelds of economics such as transport
economics, health economics and labour economics (van
Beek et al., 1997; Biesma et al., 2007; Borghans, Romans, &
Sauermann, 2010; Eriksson et al., 2012; Louviere, Hensher,
& Swait, 2000; Pouliakas & Theodossiou, 2010; Ryan, 2004).
The recent increase in the use of stated choice experiments
in economics can be attributed in part to recent studies dis-
pelling doubts that stated preferences reliably predict real
market behaviour, and showing that parameter estimates
based on stated preference data match those based on re-
vealed preference data quite well (Louviere et. al, 2000).
While van Beek et al. (1997) and Eriksson et al. (2012)
use stated choice experiments to examine employers’ ten-
dency to discriminate against job applicants on the basis of
age, beauty and ethnicity, the study of Biesma et al. (2007)
also investigates the relative importance of different types of
skills. They do this for a small sample of public health grad-
uates in the Netherlands. Our study adds to their ﬁndings
in a number of ways. First, we examine employers’ prefer-
ences for a more elaborate list of types of skills. Moreover,
we do not restrict our sample to graduates in public health in
the Netherlands. Instead, as will be discussed in detail below,
our study investigates employers’ preferences in seven occu-
pational ﬁelds in nine European countries, making it possi-
ble to test for differences in preferences across occupational
ﬁelds and countries. In addition, we adopt a two stage de-
sign (instead of focusing exclusively on the hiring stage) to
investigate whether employers’ preferences for CV attributes
are related to the types of skills they prefer in the hiring
stage. Our contribution is also methodologically as we in-
clude a no choice option which has been shown to be im-
portant in avoiding hypothetical bias (Hensher, 2010), and
as our respondents evaluate 30 vignettes per stage which
increasing the eﬃciency of the estimates and, more impor-
tantly, which allows us to derive individual level param-
eters and to estimate the standard deviation of the pref-
erence parameters. We also include a measure of price
which enables us to attach a monetary value to attribute
levels.
The experiments were conducted in June and July 2012 in
nine European countries (Czech Republic, France, Germany,
Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands and the United
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the sample.
N Percent
Country
Czech Republic 64 7.09
France 100 11.07
Germany 100 11.07
Italy 100 11.07
Netherlands 147 16.28
Poland 92 10.19
Spain 100 11.07
Sweden 99 10.96
United Kingdom 101 11.18
Occupational ﬁeld
Electro-technology 58 6.42
Engineering 186 20.6
Financial Services 160 17.72
ICT 171 18.94
Legal Services 133 14.73
Media and Communication 122 13.51
Policy and Organization 73 8.08
Firm size
<20 301 33.33
20–49 140 15.50
50–99 114 12.62
100–249 137 15.17
>250 211 23.37
Scale of the market ﬁrm is operating on
Local 142 15.73
Regional 219 24.25
National 324 35.88
International 218 24.14
Respondent’s position in the ﬁrm
General management 442 48.95
HR management/-staff 234 25.91
Other 227 25.14
Respondent’s type of involvement in past graduate recruitments
Responsible 491 54.37
Involved 412 45.63
Number of graduate recruitments respondent has been involved in during
past 5 years
1–5 446 49.39
6–10 233 25.80
11–25 116 12.85
>25 108 11.96Kingdom). Individuals registered on consumer panels of a
large international market research organization were in-
vited to participate in an online survey, not knowing its sub-
ject. Filtering questions made sure that only individuals who
had been involved in recruiting a higher education gradu-
ate in the past 5 years were eligible to participate in the
experiments. In those countries with a binary tertiary ed-
ucation system, ‘higher education graduate’ was explicitly
deﬁned as someone who graduated from a university, and
explicitly excluded graduates from universities of applied
sciences.
Our study focuses on the recruitment of graduates in a se-
lected number of occupational ﬁelds. In many occupational
ﬁelds, recruitment is to a large extent governed by legally
binding credentials. As we did not want our study to be
confounded by legal requirements, we excluded professions
in health and welfare as well as education and focused on
seven occupational ﬁelds where most of the remaining grad-
uates ﬁnd work: Electro-technology, Engineering, Financial
Services, ICT, Legal Services, Media and Communication, and
Policy and Organization.3
20.2% of the panel members who received an e-mail re-
sponded to the invitation to participate in the survey. This
number is not a response rate in the usual sense as data col-
lection in each country was automatically halted as soon as
100 employers had completed the survey. 56.8% of individ-
uals passed the ﬁrst ﬁlter question (involved in recruiting
higher education graduates in the past 5 years), and 71.2% of
those passing ﬁlter 1 passed ﬁlter 2 (involved in recruiting in
one of the seven occupational ﬁelds). 68.6% of those passing
all ﬁlter questions completed both recruitment stages (dis-
crete choice experiments). Data of those respondents who
did not complete the survey was not stored and was not used
in the analysis.
Our ﬁnal sample contains 903 respondents, most of which
hold management or HR recruitment positions in their orga-
nization. About half of the respondents have been responsi-
ble for, or involved in, the recruitment of one to ﬁve graduates
in the past 5 years and 12% of respondents are very frequent
recruiters with more than 25 graduate recruitments in the
past 5 years. Table 1 shows the most important descriptive
statistics of the sample.
In addition to respondents’ position held in the organi-
zation and recruitment frequency in the past 5 years, we
collected information on the occupational ﬁeld they are re-
cruiting for, the industry of the ﬁrm, the proportion of grad-
uates in the ﬁrm, ﬁrm size and the scale of operations of
the ﬁrm (local, regional, national, international). This infor-
mation was mainly collected for descriptive purposes. Anal-
ysis showed that the results presented in this study are
not affected by these background characteristics. They are3 The graduate surveys conducted in the frame of the REFLEX project
(Research into Employment and Professional Flexibility, 2004) and the
HEGESCO project (Higher Education as a Generator of Strategic Competen-
cies, 2008) show that about three quarters of graduates employed in grad-
uate jobs (ISCO 2 – professionals) 5 years after graduation, and who do not
work as health or education professionals, work in these seven occupational
ﬁelds. Detailed descriptive statistics evaluating the representativeness of our
sample in the light of information from REFLEX and HEGESCO are presented
in Tables A1 and A2.therefore not further discussed in the remainder of this
paper.
Before starting the ﬁrst choice experiment, respondents
were asked to imagine a situation in which they recruit a
recent higher education graduate in the occupational ﬁeld
they indicated to be recruiting for. Respondents were in-
structed that the vacancy they are recruiting for in the ex-
periment is a full-time junior position which can be char-
acterized as structural in the sense that it has a longer
time horizon. Seasonal work and short-term replacement
positions were excluded. We chose this reference frame to
make it clear to respondents that the hiring decision they
were going to make represents a commitment and invest-
ment for the ﬁrm. This means that the characteristics of the
reference person respondents had in mind will depend on
the kind of entry position employers usually have on of-
fer. Differences in the characteristics of this position, for ex-
ample the required level of education, will be captured by
differences in preferences for particular choice attributes,
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Of these 3 candidates, which one would you invite to a job interview?
Remember this is a junior position for a recent higher education graduate
Degree:
Bachelor (BA, BSc)
Degree:
Master (MA, MSc)
Degree:
Doctorate
None of 
these
Match of field of study and job tasks:
Field of study related to job tasks but no 
exact match
Match of field of study and job tasks:
Field of study unrelated to job tasks
Match of field of study and job tasks:
Field of study matches job tasks 
completely
Relevant work experience:
No
Relevant work experience:
2 years
Relevant work experience:
1 year
Study abroad:
No
Study abroad:
Partly
Study abroad:
Entirely
Grade Point Average:
Above average
Grade Point Average:
Average
Grade Point Average:
Below average
Type of university:
Average ranked university
Type of university:
Average ranked university
Type of university:
Top ranked university
Starting Salary:
Average for this position
Starting Salary:
25% below average for this position
Starting Salary:
25% above average for this position
Fig. 1. Choice set example CV attributes.
4 The general formulation of this aspect makes it easier to compare
choices across the different occupational ﬁelds and countries.
5 Unlike the degree level, we deliberately refrained from using country-
speciﬁc equivalents here (like the ‘Grande Ecoles’ in France or Russel Group
universities in the UK) as this would not be comparable across all the
countries.
6 The selection of these six types of skills is based on a review of the liter-
ature on the skills demanded of higher education graduates in today’s work-
places performed by Humburg and van der Velden (2013).for example the value employers attach to a bachelor’s
degree.
Respondents were told that when choosing the gradu-
ate proﬁles in the experiment they should think of a posi-
tion in their organization that has these characteristics, and
to keep the same position in mind for the entire exercise.
Fig. 1 presents a choice set example from the ﬁrst recruit-
ment stage.
In the ﬁrst experiment, only CV attributes which are the
result of graduates’ human capital investmentwere included,
excluding indices such as age, gender, ethnicity, beauty or re-
ligion used in other studies (van Beek et al., 1997; Eriksson
et al., 2012). Besides not being the focus of this study, exclud-
ing indices makes the evaluation of hypothetical graduates
value-free and avoids hypothetical bias.
The following common attributes and their levels are in-
cluded in the proﬁles of the ﬁrst experiment:
(1) Degree: bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, doctorate.
(2) The match between the ﬁeld of study and the job
tasks: ﬁeld of study matches job tasks. completely,
ﬁeld of study related to job tasks but no exact match,
ﬁeld of study unrelated to job tasks.
(3) Relevant work experience: no, 1 year, 2 years.
(4) Study abroad: no, partly, entirely.
(5) Grade point average: below average, average, above
average, upper 10%.
(6) Prestige/reputation of university: average, high.
(7) Starting salary: 25% below average, 10% below aver-
age, average for this position, 10% above average for
this position, 25% above average for this position.
The number of attributes on the proﬁles is seven, which
is well below the limit of 10 attributes advised in the lit-
erature in order to limit the information processing burden
on respondents (DeShazo & Fermo, 2002). The degree lev-
els used are the typical levels differentiated in higher ed-
ucation. National equivalents of these levels were used in
the various translations of the master questionnaire. The
three levels referring to the match between the ﬁeld of study
and the job tasks-attribute resemble those commonly used
in graduate surveys, indicating that the match is complete,incomplete or non-existent.4 We deliberately limited the
number of years of work experience to 2 years, reﬂecting our
intention to measure employers’ preferences for recent grad-
uates. Study experience abroad was taken up as this attribute
is increasingly common in the European context. Grade point
average was included in four levels, whereas we included the
upper 10% level to explore whether there is a return to be-
longing to the top 10% of the reference group beyond that
of having above average grades. The prestige or reputation
of the university was taken up as a two level attribute to
see whether enrolling into a university with high prestige
or reputation, rather than an average university, has an im-
pact on graduates’ chances to get invited to a job interview.5
Starting salary was taken up as an attribute to have a mea-
sure of labour costs in themodel whichmay be used to calcu-
late employers’ willingness to pay for CV attributes and their
levels.
In the second stage of the survey, we use a discrete
choice experiment to elicit employers’ preferences for par-
ticular skills in the actual hiring decision. We here include
six types of skills and the starting salary. Respondents were
told that in the ﬁrst step they had selected and invited a
pool of candidates who all seem equally suitable to do the
job the respondent was recruiting for, indicating that in this
experiment, candidates only differ with regard to the skills
included in the proﬁles. Respondents were instructed that all
candidates had been sent to an assessment centre which had
thoroughly tested their skills. The information provided on
the proﬁle presented the results from this assessment cen-
tre, containing the graduates’ skill level in the following six
domains 6:
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and skills needed to solve occupation-speciﬁc prob-
lems
(2) General academic skills: skills which one typically
associates with higher education yet which are not
occupation-speciﬁc, such as analytical thinking and
reﬂectiveness.
(3) Innovative/creative skills: the ability to come upwith
new ideas and to approach problems from a different
angle
(4) Strategic/organizational skills: the capacity to think
strategically and act in the interest of their organiza-
tion.
(5) Interpersonal skills: ability to work in a team and to
communicate and cooperate effectively with diverse
colleagues and clients.
(6) Commercial/entrepreneurial skills: ability to iden-
tify commercial risks and opportunities and being
cost-aware.
The skill levels presented on the proﬁles were whether
graduates belonged (1) to the top 25%, (2) to the average,
or (3) to the bottom 25% of their reference group. For the
purpose of readability and comprehensibility we will refer
to these levels as high, average and low skill levels.
Respondents were provided with the deﬁnitions of the
six types of skills before running the choice experiment.
In addition, by scrolling over the skill type, they were able
to recall the deﬁnition of all types of skills at any time
during the experiment. The meaningfulness and appropri-
ateness of these types of skills in the context of the re-
cruitment process had been tested with a small sample of
human resources personnel before the study started, and
was conﬁrmed in in-depth interviews which were con-
ducted later with a selection of the survey respondents.
No indication was found that a relevant skill domain was
missing.
A shortcut randomized design was used to automatically
generate the hypothetical graduate proﬁles (Chrzan & Orme,
2000) during the survey.With this type of design, proﬁles are
constructed using the least often previously used attribute
levels for a particular respondent. As a result, the occurrence
of attribute levels is balanced.
In each of the two experiments simulating the two re-
cruitment stages, respondents were presented with 10 dif-
ferent choice sets. Consequently, each of the 903 respondents
evaluated 30 graduate proﬁles per recruitment stage, so that
9030 choices per stage were observed.
A total of 130 in-depth interviews (10 interviews in
each of the nine European countries of the online sur-
vey plus Estonia, Greece and Hungary, as well as 10 large
multinational corporations) were conducted to learn more
about employers’ rationale behind the choices observed in
the experiments. Each interview lasted about one hour and
included a short version of the experiment to learn about
the motivation behind employers’ choices. In the nine coun-
tries where the online experiment was conducted, intervie-
wees were recruited from among participants of the online
study who had signalled their availability for such an inter-
view. In the other three countries and with respect to the
10 large multinational corporations databases of the marketresearch organization were used to recruit interviewees. Re-
cruitment was done according to a scheme which ensured
that all occupational ﬁelds were equally represented. Within
occupational ﬁelds, intervieweeswhere chosen randomly ex-
cept where travel costs and expenditure of time would have
been unreasonably high. The interviews took place at the
national premises of the market research organization ex-
cept for the interviews with the representatives of the large
multinational organizations, eight of whom we visited at
their headquarters and two of whomwe interviewed by tele-
phone. A 2 months period in-between the online study and
the interviews was deliberately chosen in order to allow the
results from the preliminary data analysis to be addressed in
the interviews. We developed interview guidelines contain-
ing interviewer instruction, example graduate proﬁles from
the choice experiments and the most important questions to
be asked and issues to be addressed in the interviews. We
also supplied national interviewers with a template for re-
porting the results, which were ﬁlled in in English and ana-
lyzed qualitatively.
4. Limitations
Although studies have shown that stated preferences pre-
dict real market behaviour quite well (Louviere et al., 2000),
hypothetical bias – the divergence of stated and revealed
preferences – cannot be entirely excluded. Because respon-
dents do not have to substantiate their choices with real
commitments in stated choice experiments, estimates of re-
spondents’ willingness to pay for certain attributes or out-
comes derived from stated choice experiments may be larger
than valid measures of actual willingness to pay. However,
we believe that hypothetical bias is minimal in our study.
Firstly, in a meta-analysis of 28 studies and 83 observa-
tions, Murphy, Allen, Stevens, and Weatherhead (2005) ﬁnd
a median ratio of hypothetical to actual willingness to pay
of only 1.35. Secondly, several features of our study have
been reported to reduce hypothetical bias (Hensher, 2010;
Ladenburg, Olsen, & Nielsen, 2007; Murphy et al., 2005): the
use of a choice-based design (as opposed to direct pricing),
the existence of a no-choice option (to accommodate am-
bivalence, indifference or uncertainty), the private nature of
the good being studied (as opposed to public), and the use
of experienced respondents (as opposed to students in a lab).
Moreover, in contrast to studies investigating labour market
discrimination of particular groups of individuals, the CV at-
tributes and types of skills included in our experiments are
not prone to social desirability bias.
An aspect of study which may potentially limit the gen-
eralizability of our results is our operationalization of the
hiring stage. In our setting, employers are assumed to get
reliable information on graduates’ level of skills relative to
others, which may not apply to all employers’ actual recruit-
ment practice. From our results, we can therefore infer the
relative importance of types of skills if employers have this
information. Employers who do not assess job applicants in
this manner and who therefore do not have accurate infor-
mation on graduates’ levels of different types of skills may
in reality base their hiring decision on signals or proxies
for these skills. Nevertheless, the interviewees indicated that
they perceived the experimental setting as realistic even if
30 M. Humburg, R. van der Velden / Economics of Education Review 49 (2015) 24–41they did not use assessment centres themselves, thus con-
ﬁrming the validity of our results even for employers who
use different methods to assess skills.
5. Econometric model
We use the mixed logit model to estimate employers’
preference for our selection of CV attributes and types of
skills. In our discrete choice experiments, the probability of
an alternative (a hypothetical graduate) being chosen de-
pends on its characteristics displayed on the proﬁles shown
to respondents, and the difference between its utility and
the utilities of the other three alternatives, including the
“none of these” option. A conditional logit framework as de-
veloped by McFadden (1974) is appropriate for estimating
the relative importance of graduate characteristics in these
kinds of choice settings. The mixed logit model we use in
this study is an advanced version of the original conditional
logit model, allowing the coeﬃcients to vary by individual.
While the mean coeﬃcients estimated by both types of mod-
els do not differ qualitatively (not shown here) the mixed
logit model estimates the standard deviation of the mean
coeﬃcients, thereby providing information on the extent to
which employers’ preferences for particular characteristics
differ.
Like any discrete choice model consistent with random
utility theory, the mixed logit model assumes that an in-
dividual faces a choice amongst J alternatives in each of T
choice situations. The model is well explained in Hensher
and Greene (2003) and Train (2009), on which the fol-
lowing description is strongly based. In our speciﬁcation,
coeﬃcients that enter utility are treated as varying over
individuals but being constant over choice situations for
each individual. The utility that individual n obtains from
alternative j in choice situation t can be written as Unjt =
βnxnjt + εnjt, where xnjt is the vector of observed variables (in
our case attribute levels), coeﬃcient vector βn is unobserved
for each n and varies in the population with density f(βn|θ ∗)
where θ ∗ are the true parameters of this distribution, and
εnjt is an unobserved random term that is distributed iid
extreme value over choice situations, individuals, and alter-
natives. Conditional on βn, the probability that individual n
chooses alternative i in choice situation t is assumed to be
logit:
Lnit(βn) =
eβn
′
xnit∑
j e
βn
′
xn jt
. (1)
The unconditional probability is the integral of the con-
ditional probability over all possible values of βn, which de-
pends on the parameters of the distribution of βn. We specify
the density of βn to be normal with mean b and covariance
W [φ(βn|b,W)]. This allows the coeﬃcients to have positive
or negative signs for different decision makers. The choice
probability under this density becomes:
Qnit(b,W) =
∫
eβn
′
xnit∑
j e
βn
′
xn jt
φ(βn|b,W)dβn (2)
where b and W are the parameters of interest to be
estimated.
If, as normally the case in stated choice experiments, a
sampled individual faces a sequence of choice situations, itis the probability of the sequence of observed choices which
matters for maximum likelihood estimation. Let i(n,t) denote
the alternative that individual n chose in choice situation t.
Conditional onβn, the probability that individual nmade this
sequence of choices is the product of logit formulas:
Sn(βn) =
T∏
t=1
[
eβn
′
xni(n,t)t∑
j e
βn
′
xn jt
]
. (3)
The unconditional probability for the observed sequence of
choices is (see Train, 2009):
Pn(b,W) =
∫ T∏
t=1
[
eβn
′
xni(n,t)t∑
j e
βn
′
xn jt
]
φ(βn|b,W)dβn. (4)
One of the reasons why mixed logit models have only be-
come a promising tool in data analysis recently is that the
integral in (4) necessary for exact maximum likelihood esti-
mation cannot be calculated analytically as it does not have a
closed form in general. The integral is approximated through
simulation and the simulated log-likelihood function is max-
imized. For a given value of the parameters b and W (mean
and covariance of normally distributed βn) a value of βn is
drawn from its distribution. Using this draw Sn(βn) (Eq. (3))
is calculated. This process is repeated for many draws, and
themean of the resulting Sn(βn)s is taken as the approximate
choice probability:
SPn(b,W) = 1
R
R∑
r=1
Sn(βn
r|b,W ) (5)
where R is the number of draws of βn, βnr|b,W is the rth draw
from φ(βn|b,W), and SPn(b,W) is the simulated probability of
individual n’s sequence of observed choices. The simulated
log-likelihood function is constructed as:
SLL(b,W) =
N∑
n=1
ln (SPn(b,W) (6)
and the estimated parameters are those who maximize SLL.
As noted in Revelt and Train (1998), the log of the simulated
probability with a ﬁxed number of draws is not an unbiased
estimate of the log of the true probability. However, the bias
in SLL decreases as the number of draws increases, and 500
draws commonly generate adequate results. We use 1000
draws in our estimation.
6. The right CV for getting invited to the job interview
Table 2 presents the results of the mixed logit model for
graduates’ probability of getting invited to a job interview.
With the exception of the coeﬃcients for attribute levels
“master’s degree” and “study abroad entirely”, all coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcant. The insigniﬁcance of the coeﬃ-
cients for “master’s degree” and “study abroad entirely” is a
remarkable ﬁnding. We will show below that this mean re-
sult masks the opposing views of employers from different
countries.
The match between the ﬁeld of study and the job tasks
is one of the most important CV attributes with the mean
coeﬃcient of a complete match being 1.137 and that of the
ﬁeld of study and the job tasks being related being 0.709.
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Table 2
Mixed logit model of selecting graduates for a job interview.
Attributes with normally distributed coeﬃcients
Degree
Bachelor’s Ref.
Master’s
Mean coeﬃcient 0.045 (0.05)
SD of coeﬃcient 0 (0.07)
Doctorate
Mean coeﬃcient −0.357∗∗∗ (0.06)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.195∗∗∗ (0.08)
Match of ﬁeld of study and job tasks
Unrelated Ref.
Incomplete
Mean coeﬃcient 0.709∗∗∗ (0.06)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.762∗∗∗ (0.10)
Complete
Mean coeﬃcient 1.137∗∗∗ (0.07)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.228∗∗∗ (0.07)
Relevant work experience
No Ref.
1 year
Mean coeﬃcient 0.556∗∗∗ (0.05)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.775∗∗∗ (0.07)
2 years
Mean coeﬃcient 0.711∗∗∗ (0.06)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.179∗∗∗ (0.08)
Study experience abroad
No Ref.
Partly
Mean coeﬃcient 0.123∗∗ (0.04)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.542∗∗∗ (0.10)
Entirely
Mean coeﬃcient −0.004 (0.05)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.795∗∗∗ (0.07)
Grades
Below average Ref.
Average
Mean coeﬃcient 0.355∗∗∗ (0.05)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.575∗∗∗ (0.07)
Above average
Mean coeﬃcient 0.549∗∗∗ (0.06)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.784∗∗∗ (0.08)
Top 10%
Mean coeﬃcient 0.579∗∗∗ (0.06)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.790∗∗∗ (0.08)
Prestige/reputation of university
Average Ref.
High
Mean of coeﬃcient 0.130∗∗∗ (0.04)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.457∗∗∗ (0.07)
Fixed coeﬃcient attributes
Salary
25% below average 0.935∗∗∗ (0.08)
10% below average 0.980∗∗∗ (0.07)
Average 1.044∗∗∗ (0.07)
10% above average 0.600∗∗∗ (0.06)
25% above average Ref.
None 0.083 (0.16)
Standard errors adjusted for 903 clusters (individuals) in parentheses. ∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Estimation based on 1000 random draws per
iteration. Log likelihood −9627.26, N = 36120. TheWald-test of the joint sig-
niﬁcance of the attributes with 17 degrees of freedom is 1071.73 and has
a p-value > 0.000. The model has no alternative-speciﬁc constants, as is
common practice with data from so-called unlabelled discrete choice exper-
iments, where randomly generated alternatives (graduates) have no utility
beyond the characteristics attributed to them in the experiment. The use
of unlabelled discrete choice experiments also implies that no meaningful
marginal effects can be calculated. In order to illustrate the effect of changes
in the attribute levels on graduates’ chances to get invited to a job interview,
we compare the predicted probabilities to be chosen of two graduates who
only differ with regard to one attribute level in Table A3.Having a degree in a ﬁeld of study which matches the job
tasks of the vacancy well gives graduates a decisive advan-
tage over competing applicants who do not have this match.
Considering the size of the mean coeﬃcients of the levels
of the other attributes, a disadvantage with respect to the
match between the ﬁeld of study and the job tasks will be
diﬃcult to compensate for with an advantage with respect
to another attribute. Results from the interviews suggest that
the importance of the match between the ﬁeld of study and
the job tasks in the recruitment process stems from employ-
ers’ expectation that graduates with a complete match have
higher levels of occupation-speciﬁc human capital and will
therefore require a shorter adjustment period and less ﬁrm-
provided training.7
A second attribute which can be understood as a mea-
sure of graduates’ stock of occupation-speciﬁc human cap-
ital and low training costs is relevant work experience.
Relevant work experience has a substantial impact on gradu-
ates’ probability to get invited to a job interview for a junior
position. The mean coeﬃcient of 2 years of work experience,
as opposed to none, is similar to that of having a ﬁeld of study
which is related, as opposed to unrelated, to the job on offer
(0.711 vs. 0.709). This implies that relevant work experience
can to some extent compensate for a lacking match between
the ﬁeld of study and the job tasks; a graduate with 2 years
of relevant work experience and a ﬁeld of study unrelated to
the job tasks has a similar probability of being invited to a job
interview as a graduate with an incomplete match between
the ﬁeld of study and the job tasks and no relevant work ex-
perience, all other attributes being equal. Likewise, a grad-
uate with an incomplete match between the ﬁeld of study
and the job tasks and 1 year of relevant work experience
has a similar probability of being invited to a job interview
as a graduate with a complete match and no relevant work
experience.
There are obvious decreasing marginal returns to rele-
vant work experience, and the ﬁrst year increases gradu-
ates’ chances to get invited to a job interview most. The
mean coeﬃcient of the second year of relevant work expe-
rience is slightly larger and statistically signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from the ﬁrst. The in-depth interviews indicate that an
important difference between the match of ﬁeld of study
and job tasks and relevant work experience is that relevant
work experience is not only a signal of graduates’ stock of
occupation-speciﬁc knowledge and skills, but also one of
general productive factors such as punctuality, attitudes to-
wards hierarchical settings, and familiarity with work-life in
general.8
Remarkably, the standard deviation of 0.775 implies that
23.7% of employers have a negative coeﬃcient for the 1
year of relevant work experience dummy [φ(−0.556/0.775)].
The in-depth interviews suggest that this is not merely7 “The discipline is really amain indicator for how quickly someone is bro-
ken in. The question always at the very fore is how long it will take before the
applicant pays off.” (Respondent 5, Policy and Organization, Management
consultancy, Germany). Quotes always indicate the respondent number as
well as the interviewee’s occupational ﬁeld, industry and country.
8 “Work experience does not only represent professional skills, but the
ability to wake up every day, go to work, where you […] must do what your
boss asks you to do.” (Respondent 8, Finance, Bank, Hungary).
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coeﬃcient but that this represents real employer prefer-
ences. Whereas most employers prefer graduates who have
demonstrated their functioning in work-life and have gath-
ered experience which enables them to “hit the ground
running”, as one employer expressed it, there are also those
employers who prefer “fresh” graduates. These employers
argue that individuals who just graduated from university
could be integrated into the ﬁrm’s culture more easily.9
Employers’ indifference between graduates with a bach-
elor’s and a master’s degree in the pooled sample masks
opposing views on the value of these two degrees in dif-
ferent countries. A separate analysis presented in Table A4
reveals that in the UK, graduates with a bachelor’s de-
gree are actually preferred over graduates with a master’s
degree, whereas in the Czech Republic, France, Germany
and Poland employers tend to prefer graduates with mas-
ter’s degrees over graduates with bachelor’s degrees when
it comes to ﬁlling vacancies for junior positions. In Italy
and Spain, employers’ average preference for master’s de-
grees does not signiﬁcantly differ from that of employ-
ers in the UK, and in the Netherlands and Sweden, em-
ployers on average seem to be indifferent about the two
degrees.
The negative mean coeﬃcient of the doctorate attribute
level indicates that the average employer in our sample val-
ues a doctorate less than a master’s or a bachelor’s degree, all
other things being equal. This result may be driven by the
speciﬁc context of our experiment where employers were
asked to recruit a graduate for a typical junior position in
their organization. The in-depth interviews brought forth
several arguments why some employers are hesitant to hire
a doctorate for a junior position, ranging from doctorates be-
ing too ambitious to doctorates being too theoretical in their
approach for the average junior position. As recruitment is
costly, employers try to avoid hiring graduates whowill leave
the organization as soon as a better opportunity opens up.
Moreover, for some of the interviewed employers the doc-
torate sends a mixed signal: while employers tend to take
for granted that doctorates who apply for junior positions
have an elevated level of knowledge, they expect them to
have a lower level of other productive factors – such as mo-
tivation or self-conﬁdence – than their counterparts who ap-
ply for positions which better match their qualiﬁcation level.
While our estimates suggest that the average employer is
hesitant to consider doctorates for his or her junior posi-
tion the signiﬁcant standard deviation of the mean coeﬃ-
cient for the doctorate attribute level implies that 38.3% of
employers prefer doctorates over graduates with bachelor’s
degrees (the coeﬃcient of the dummy indicating a doctorate
level is positive for 38.3% of employers, [1 − φ(0.357/1.195)],9 “If you need to train someone in quality control, for example, each com-
pany has its own way of working. We prefer to take a young, inexperienced
candidate, especially so we can integrate him into a team. It is easier than
with a person who has experience.” (Respondent 7, R&D, Pharmaceutical In-
dustry, France). “The odds are in favour of persons with more experience. On
the other hand since this is a junior position we approach it in a way that
sometimes it is better to take a person with no experience, to teach him ev-
erything, than to accept a person with manners that do not fully correspond
to our organization.” (Respondent 3, Finance, Bank, Poland).and that there is a relevant labour market segment for
doctorates.
Having above average as opposed to below average grades
matters similarly for graduates’ chances of getting invited to
a job interview as does having 1 year of relevant work expe-
rience. Graduates can compensate for their low grades with
relevant work experience, yet graduates with high grades
have a higher chance of getting a job.
Marginal returns to grades are decreasing. Employers
seem to put the most value on avoiding below average per-
formers. On average, belonging to the upper 10% of the grades
distribution has no additional effect on graduates’ probabil-
ity to be invited to a job interview over and above the effect
of having above average grades.10 However, this is not the
case for some junior positions with high skill requirements
and possibly better career prospects: some employers inter-
viewed in-depth indicated that they exclusively recruit grad-
uates who are among the best 5% with regard to grades.11
Graduates who have spent some time abroad during their
studies are, on average, preferred by employers over grad-
uates who did not gather any study experience abroad. Be-
sides being an indicator of foreign language skills, the in-
depth interviews strongly suggest that this attribute level is
often used by employers as a signal of graduates’ indepen-
dence and resourcefulness. However, in line with the rel-
atively small coeﬃcient of the “study experience abroad:
partly” attribute from the quantitative analysis, the in-depth
interviews suggest that rather than being decisive for em-
ployers’ ﬁnal decision to invite a graduate to a job interview
or not, having some study experience abroad is seen as a nice
extra and may tip the balance in the improbable case that
two graduates are otherwise identical.12
Judging from the pooled sample of employers, having
studied entirely abroad does not improve graduates’ chances
of getting invited to a job interview when compared to grad-
uates who studied exclusively in the home country. How-
ever, as shown in Table A5 there is substantial variation
across employers from different countries. Employers from
the UK on average prefer graduates who studied exclusively
at home over graduates who followed entire programmes
abroad. The average employer in the Czech Republic, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden seems to be in-
different between graduates who did not go abroad during
their studies and graduates who earned a degree abroad, all
else being equal. The signalling value of having studied en-
tirely abroad, without speciﬁcation where precisely the de-
gree was obtained, is only positive in Italy and Poland. When
running a separate conditional logistic regression with the
“studied abroad: entirely” attribute interacted with a coun-
try’s annual expenditure on higher education excluding R&D
activities per student (in purchasing power parity US10 The difference between the mean coeﬃcients of both attribute levels is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
11 “We, just as our competitors in the market, are basically trying to at-
tract the top 3–5% of graduates in terms of grades as well as the inten-
sity and quality of education.” (Respondent 1, Legal, Multinational law ﬁrm,
Germany).
12 “Studies abroad? Not that important for this position, but not a down-
side either.” (Respondent 4, Policy and Organization, Public administration,
Sweden).
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Table 3
Employers’ willingness to pay for CV attribute levels.
Mean WTP SD
Degree
Bachelor’s Ref.
Master’s 1.0% 22.0%
Doctorate −8.0% 26.9%
Match of ﬁeld of study and job tasks
Unrelated Ref.
Incomplete 16.0% 17.2%
Complete 25.6% 27.6%
Relevant work experience
No Ref.
1 year 12.5% 17.5%
2 years 16.0% 26.6%
Study experience abroad
No Ref.
Partly 2.8% 12.2%
Entirely −0.1% 17.9%
Grades
Below average Ref.
Average 8.0% 12.9%
Above average 12.4% 17.7%
Top 10% 13.0% 17.8%
Prestige/reputation of university
Average Ref.
High 2.9% 10.3%
Willingness to pay is assumed to be distributed normally in the popula-
tion with mean MeanWTP and standard deviation SD. For calculation, the
difference between the average salary level coeﬃcient and the 10% above
average salary level coeﬃcient (1.044− 0.600= 0.444) presents ameasure
of 10% of the averagewage. Using the rule of three, themeanwillingness to
pay for a particular attribute level – in percent of the average salary com-
pared to the reference attribute level – can be calculated by multiplying
its coeﬃcient estimate by 10 and then dividing it by 0.444. The standard
deviations of the willingness to pay are calculated using the same rule
but replacing the mean coeﬃcients with the coeﬃcients of the standard
deviations.Dollars)13 as a proxy for how respondents perceive the qual-
ity of their national higher education system, we ﬁnd the in-
teraction term to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant.14
This indicates that employers’ preference for graduates with
a foreign degree may have a systematic negative relationship
with the good reputation of national universities.
While relevant, the importance of the university’s pres-
tige15 in the recruitment process is much smaller than that of
thematch between the ﬁeld of study and the job tasks or that
of relevant work experience. Its impact is, however, compa-
rable to having partly studied abroad or to having above aver-
age grades. The in-depth interviews suggest that the prestige
of the university is a signal for both the positive self-selection
(and thus higher than average ability) of graduates as well as
the quality and rigour of education. Many employers inter-
viewed in-depth therefore indicated that they use the pres-
tige of the university to validate grades.16
The hypothetical candidate proﬁles also included the
starting salary the graduate would have to be paid when
hired. Fig. 3 illustrates employers’ preference for starting
salary. While higher than average starting salaries (almost)
linearly decrease employers’ preference for candidates, lower
than average salaries do not affect employers’ selection deci-
sion in favour of applicants. One possible explanation is that
employers’ preferences reﬂect institutional arrangements. In
the in-depth interviews, many employers stated that gradu-
ate salaries were usually ﬁxed and advertised with the job
speciﬁcation. If negotiation takes place then it seems to be
with respect to getting a higher than average salary if jus-
tiﬁed by a higher level of qualiﬁcation or work experience.
In-depth interviews from all participating countries suggest
that many European employers experience the below aver-
age starting salary attribute levels as meaningless as it seems
neither intended nor feasible to pay an employee less than
the institutionalized or market salary. 1713 Source: Education at a Glance 2014 with 2011 ﬁgures. The Czech Re-
public (6.320), Italy (6.482) and Poland (7.916) are the three countries with
the lowest annual expenditure per student in PPP USD. The Netherlands
(10.665), the UK (10.570) and France (10.470) are the countries with the
highest annual expenditure per student in PPP USD. In the regression, ex-
penditure is entered as a multiple of 1000 USD.
14 The logit coeﬃcient of the main effect of “study abroad: entirely” is
0.697∗∗∗ (s.e. = 0.17) and the coeﬃcient of the interaction term −0.074∗∗∗
(s.e. = 0.018).
15 It is important to note that the translation to the languages of the nine
countries in which the study was carried out was based on keeping the
meaning comparable across countries but adjusting the concept to the na-
tional context where necessary. For example, in the UK where university
rankings are widely known, used and available, high prestige was translated
to high ranking. Referring to ranking would, however, not make much sense
in countries like the Netherlands or Germany. In these countries, the con-
cept of reputation was used. This was done as the concept we had in mind
for prestige was rather broad, pertaining to the subjective evaluation of a
university, not necessarily an objective one. This, however, has to be taken
into account when interpreting the results.
16 “There are universities that are extremely easy, and if on top of that the
person does not have good marks, then this means it is not a very bright
person.” (Respondent 6, Legal, Electric Utility Company, Spain).
17 “Starting salary is not a choice criterion for us […] those graduates’
salary wishes are very realistic and it’s our policy that we don’t want to pay
them less than the market average.” (Respondent 5, ICT, IT, Estonia). “You
will likely have a hard time retaining graduates long-term that you have
pressed too hard on their salary requirements.”(Respondent 2, Financial Ser-
vices, Engineering, Germany). “Everybody enters at the same level with theIf we accept that the parameter estimates for above av-
erage salary levels are a good representation of employers’
average preferences for labour costs, we can use these es-
timates to calculate employers’ willingness to pay (WTP)
for CV attribute levels (Revelt & Train, 1998). The differ-
ence between the average salary level coeﬃcient and the 10%
above average salary level coeﬃcient (1.044− 0.600= 0.444)
presents ameasure of 10% of the averagewage. Using the rule
of three, the monetary value of a particular attribute level –
in percent of the average wage compared to the reference at-
tribute level – can be calculated by multiplying its coeﬃcient
estimate by 10 and then dividing it by 0.444. The standard
deviations of the willingness to pay are calculated using the
same rule but replacing the mean coeﬃcients with the co-
eﬃcients of the standard deviation. Employers’ willingness
to pay and its standard deviation for particular CV attribute
levels is presented in Table 3. 18same salary decided by the National Contract. Then it is a matter of length
of service to decide the increase” (Respondent 2, Media, IT, Italy).
18 Because the decrease in the preference of above average salaries is al-
most linear, using the 25% above average salary level coeﬃcient instead
of the 10% above average salary level coeﬃcient only slightly changes
willingness to pay estimates. For example, the willingness to pay for a ﬁeld
of study which matches the job tasks incompletely would rise from 16 to
17%.
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21 Note that in accordance with the attribute levels used in the choice ex-
periment, a graduate has a low skill level if he or she belongs to the bottom
25% of his or her reference group, and a high level of skill if he or she belongs
to the top 25% of his or her reference group.
22 The coeﬃcient of the dummy indicating a high level of professional ex-Table 3 shows that on average employers are willing to
pay a 12.5% higher wage for the ﬁrst year of work experience.
The standard deviation of 17.5% implies that the variation in
this willingness to pay is quite substantial. The return to a
second year of relevant work experience, over and above that
of the ﬁrst year, is 3.5% on average. This is very much in line
with estimatedMincerian returns to experience of around 4%
for European countries (Bils & Klenow, 2000). Even after ac-
counting for a steep learning curve in the ﬁrst year of work,
employers’ very high willingness to pay for the ﬁrst year of
relevant work experience strongly suggests that work expe-
rience is a very important signal of general work readiness
and that employers are willing to pay a premium for reduc-
ing their risk of hiring someonewho is not ready for work-life
yet.
In conclusion, CV attributes indicating occupation-
speciﬁc human capital, a shorter adjustment period in the
job and a lower need for less ﬁrm-provided training have the
highest impact on graduates’ probability of getting invited to
a job interview. In addition, graduates’ general ability and ca-
pacity to learn as indicated by above average grades – sig-
nalling low training costs – have a substantial impact on em-
ployers’ choices. These results support the view that general
human capital can to some extent compensate for speciﬁc
human capital but not entirely. Other CV attributes, such as
study experience abroad or the reputation of the university,
aremuch fuzzier signals of graduates’ human capital than the
match between the ﬁeld of study and the job tasks, relevant
work experience and grades. They also determine employers’
choices but to a much lesser degree.
Interestingly, employers’ preferences do not cluster along
the lines of categories often used to describe them. In an
extended analysis not shown here, we tested whether em-
ployers’ preferences for CV attributes differed by ﬁrm size,
occupational ﬁeld, nationality and the degree to which the
ﬁrm is operating on the local, regional, national or inter-
national market.19 With the exception of graduates’ degree
and study experience abroad, which were brieﬂy discussed
above, no systematic differences were found. This suggests
that employers’ needs are too diverse to be captured by these
variables.
The statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of the none-
option dummy implies that employers are indifferent be-
tween inviting no one or a graduate with a relatively weak
CV to the job interview. This may be an indication of the rel-
atively low risk involved in inviting the wrong graduate to a
job interview.2019 We focus here on employer categories most referred to in the literature.
Other background variables we collected, such as industry, the respondent’s
kind of involvement in the recruiting process, the role of the respondent in
the ﬁrm, the number of graduate recruitments the respondent was involved
in in the past 5 years, or the proportion of graduates in the ﬁrm do also not
explain the heterogeneity of preferences.
20 The none-option dummy was included in the model assuming a
ﬁxed rather than a randomly varying parameter. The coeﬃcient expresses
whether employers’ utility is higher when not inviting anybody compared
to inviting the reference graduate. In our case, this is the graduate with a
ﬁeld of study unrelated to the job task, no work experience, below average
grades, a bachelor’s degree from a university of average prestige or reputa-
tion, no study abroad, and with a starting salary of 25% above average.7. Which skills are getting graduates the job?
Table 4 presents the results of the second stated choice
experiment of the survey in which we asked respondents to
select the graduates theywould hire. As shown in Fig. 2, grad-
uates now differed with regard to their mastery of different
types of skills and could be considered equally suited in all
other respects. Therefore, in contrast to the ﬁrst stage of the
experiment, the estimated parameters represent employers’
preferences for actual skills, not for some other dimension of
human capital.
As expected, employers always prefer higher skill levels
over lower skill levels, no matter what skill type they are
considering. There is, however, an obvious asymmetry be-
tween the penalty for low21 skill levels and the reward for
high skill levels: the positive coeﬃcients of the dummies in-
dicating that graduates have a high skill level are always less
than half the size, in absolute terms, of the negative coeﬃ-
cients of the dummies indicating that graduates have a low
skill level.
With respect to the probability of being hired, the reward
for having a high skill level as opposed to an average one is
largest for professional expertise and smallest for commer-
cial/entrepreneurial skills. The reward for having a high skill
level is second-largest for interpersonal skills, followed by
innovative/creative skills and strategic/organizational skills.
The reward for a high level of general academic skills lies
somewhere in between that of strategic-organizational skills
and commercial/entrepreneurial skills. These differences are,
however, not always statistically signiﬁcant.22
The penalty23 for having low skill levels as opposed to av-
erage skill levels is larger than the premium for having high
skill levels. Two ﬁndings stand out. First, the negative coeﬃ-
cient of the dummy indicating that graduates have a low level
of interpersonal skills is largest. While not statistically signif-
icantly different from that of professional skills, this result
highlights the importance of interpersonal skills in today’s
workplaces. The in-depth interviews indicate that employers
attach a high value to having at least an average level of in-
terpersonal skills, as one team member with a low level ofpertise is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from that of interpersonal
skills, yet is statistically signiﬁcantly different from the other coeﬃcients (at
the 10% level for innovative/creative skills). The coeﬃcient of a high level
of interpersonal skills is statistically signiﬁcantly different from that of gen-
eral academic skills and commercial/entrepreneurial skills (10% level and 5%
level, respectively) and the reward to a high level of innovative/creative skills
as well as strategic/organizational skills is statistically signiﬁcantly different
from that of commercial/entrepreneurial skills (10% level).
23 We deliberately ran the model with average skills as the reference cat-
egory to emphasize that there is a penalty for having low skill levels, rather
than a reward for having average skill levels. The vast majority of employers
interviewed in-depth state that they consider an average skill level as the
minimum skill level necessary to come into consideration for the job (note
that in our deﬁnition, the average level contains 50% of individuals around
the mean). This implies that graduates with skill deﬁciencies are seriously
disrupting the production process, incurring costs to the organization.
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Of these 3 candidates, which one would you hire?
Remember this is a junior position for a recent higher education graduate
Starting Salary:
10% below average for this position
Professional expertise:
Bottom 25%
General academic skills:
Top 25%
Innovative/creative skills:
Top 25%
Strategic/organizational skills:
Average
Interpersonal skills:
Bottom 25%
Commercial/entrepreneurial skills:
Average
Starting Salary:
Average for this position
Professional expertise:
Average
General academic skills:
Average
Innovative/creative skills:
Bottom 25%
Strategic/organizational skills:
Bottom 25%
Interpersonal skills:
Top 25%
Commercial/entrepreneurial skills:
Bottom 25%
Starting Salary:
10% above average for this position
Professional expertise:
Top 25%
General academic skills:
Bottom 25%
Innovative/creative skills:
Average
Strategic/organizational skills:
Top 25%
Interpersonal skills:
Average
Commercial/entrepreneurial skills:
Top 25%
None of 
these
Fig. 2. Choice set example skills.
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Fig. 3. Graphical illustration of salary attribute coeﬃcients displayed in Table 2.interpersonal skills can endanger the functioning – and thus
productivity – of an entire team.24
Second, while the reward for a high level of commer-
cial/entrepreneurial skills is relatively small, the penalty for
a low level is relatively large, comparable to that of having a
low level of professional expertise. In line with the ﬁndings
of Mason (1998, 1990) employers avoid employees with no
commercial intuition or sense of entrepreneurship.
The reward for having a high skill level is similar for
innovative/creative and strategic/organizational skills. How-
ever, the penalty for having a low skill level is higher
for innovative/creative skills. The penalty for having a low
level, as opposed to an average one, is similar for strate-
gic/organizational and general academic skills.
Employers attach the highest overall importance to pro-
fessional expertise and interpersonal skills (the difference
between the coeﬃcients of the high and the low skill lev-24 “Somebody who cannot give a good presentation or who is not well
trained in presenting him or herself… we would take this into account but
we would not put too much weight on it. We know that we offer intensive
training in this area. What matters more to us is that a plurality of our em-
ployees in the area for which we are recruiting is positive about being able
to work with this person. This is really important to us as one spends quite
some time here and it really should ﬁt together well.” (Respondent 1, Legal,
Multinational law ﬁrm, Germany).els). The in-depth interviews suggest that employers ex-
pect graduates with high levels of professional expertise to
already have been exposed to the occupational challenges
occurring most often and to be able to perform the new job
tasks quickly. Given the smaller coeﬃcients for general aca-
demic skills, the average employer does not seem to perceive
professional expertise and general academic skills as perfect
substitutes, possibly because the latter implies higher costs
for training and a longer adjustment period.
In some instances the inﬂuence of innovative/creative
skills, strategic/organizational skills and commercial/
entrepreneurial skills in the hiring decision is not sta-
tistically separable from that of interpersonal skills and
professional expertise. 25 The ﬁndings from the in-depth
interviews indicate that they nevertheless tend to form a
group of relatively less important skills for labour market
entry. In the in-depth interviews, employers acknowledge
these three skills as being important, but for further career
development rather than for immediate employability. Some
interviewees argued that these types of skills determine25 The difference of the coeﬃcients of the dummies indicating a high level
of interpersonal skills, innovative/creative skills and strategic/organizational
skills is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The difference of the
coeﬃcients of the dummies indicating a low level of professional expertise
and commercial/entrepreneurial skills is not statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table 4
Mixed logit model of selecting graduates for hiring.
Attributes with normally distributed coeﬃcients
Professional expertise
High
Mean coeﬃcient 0.507∗∗∗ (0.08)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.969∗∗∗ (0.12)
Average Ref.
Low
Mean coeﬃcient −1.219∗∗∗ (0.09)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.300∗∗∗ (0.12)
General academic skills
High
Mean coeﬃcient 0.305∗∗∗ (0.05)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.657∗∗∗ (0.07)
Average Ref.
Low
Mean coeﬃcient −0.900∗∗∗ (0.08)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.140∗∗∗ (0.10)
Innovative/creative skills
High
Mean coeﬃcient 0.392∗∗∗ (0.05)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.660∗∗∗ (0.10)
Average Ref.
Low
Mean coeﬃcient −1.045∗∗∗ (0.07)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.176∗∗∗ (0.21)
Strategic/organizational skills
High
Mean coeﬃcient 0.376∗∗∗ (0.06)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.693∗∗∗ (0.11)
Average Ref.
Low
Mean coeﬃcient −0.878∗∗∗ (0.07)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.859∗∗∗ (0.08)
Interpersonal skills
High
Mean coeﬃcient 0.422∗∗∗ (0.06)
SD of coeﬃcient 0.844∗∗∗ (0.08)
Average Ref.
Low
Mean coeﬃcient −1.329∗∗∗ (0.09)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.350∗∗∗ (0.10)
Commercial/entrepreneurial skills
High
Mean coeﬃcient 0.248∗∗∗ (0.06)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.136∗∗∗ (0.13)
Average Ref.
Low
Mean coeﬃcient −1.114∗∗∗ (0.07)
SD of coeﬃcient 1.105∗∗∗ (0.09)
Fixed coeﬃcient attributes
Salary
25% below average 0.014 (0.07)
10% below average −0.019 (0.06)
Average Ref.
10% above average −0.340∗∗∗ (0.07)
25% above average −0.874∗∗∗ (0.1)
None −2.515∗∗∗ (0.12)
Standard errors adjusted for 903 clusters (individuals) in parentheses. ∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Estimation based on 1000 random draws per
iteration. Log likelihood −8674.02, N = 36120. TheWald-test of the joint sig-
niﬁcance of the attributes with 17 degrees of freedom is 1252.29 and has
a p-value > 0.000. The model has no alternative-speciﬁc constants, as is
common practice with data from so-called unlabelled choice experiments,
where randomly generated alternatives (graduates) have no utility beyond
the characteristics attributed to them in the experiment. The use of unla-
belled discrete choice experiments also implies that nomeaningful marginal
effects can be calculated. In order to illustrate the effect of changes in the at-
tribute levels on graduates’ chances to get hired, we compare the predicted
probabilities to be chosen of two graduates who only differ with regard to
one attribute level in Table A6.
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Fig. 4. Graphical illustration of salary attribute coeﬃcients displayed in
Table 4.employees’ selection for promotion and the ease and speed
with which they leave the junior position.26
Finally, in additional analyses not shown here27 we ﬁnd
no systematic differences in the relative importance of types
of skills between employers of different countries, occupa-
tional ﬁelds, ﬁrm size and international market exposure.
The coeﬃcient of the none-option dummy is negative and
highly signiﬁcant, indicating that employers are on average
better off hiring a graduate with average levels of all skills
and earning the average salary than hiring no one. However,
when running amodel with the bottom skill level and a start-
ing salary of 25% above average as the reference category (not
shown here), the none-option dummy is positive and signif-
icant, suggesting that it is better to hire no one rather than
taking the risk of hiring a graduate without the necessary
skills.
Employers’ preference for starting salary in the hiring
stage is similar to that of the interview stage. Lower than av-
erage starting salaries are not associated with a higher prob-
ability of being hired. As suggested in the previous section,
a possible explanation for this result is that paying gradu-
ates less than the average is, for the average employer, either
not possible (because of institutional agreements) or not de-
sirable (because of disruption in the group), or both. In con-
trast, employers’ preference for graduates decreases linearly
for above average salaries, as shown in Fig. 4.
Table 5 28 indicates that employers are willing to pay on
average a 14.9% higher salary for a graduate with a high level26 “We do not ask for this [commercial/entrepreneurial] skill because it
does not need to be considered for junior positions. However, if one were
in the top 25% for this skill, it could be useful in the future in some client
account position.” (Respondent 2, ICT, ICT, Czech Republic).
27 Available from the authors upon request.
28 Willingness to pay in this recruitment stage is calculated similarly to
willingness to pay in the ﬁrst recruitment stage. The difference between the
average salary level coeﬃcient (reference category) and the 10% above av-
erage salary level coeﬃcient (0 − (−0.340) = 0.340) presents a measure of
10% of the average wage. Using the rule of three, themeanwillingness to pay
for a particular attribute level – in percent of the average salary compared
to the reference attribute level – can be calculated by multiplying its coeﬃ-
cient estimate by 10 and then dividing it by 0.340. The standard deviations
of the willingness to pay are calculated using the same rule but replacing
the mean coeﬃcients with the coeﬃcients of the standard deviations. Using
the coeﬃcient of the 25% above average salary level instead of the 10% above
average salary level results in almost identical estimates.
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Table 5
Employers’ willingness to pay for skills.
MeanWTP SD
Professional expertise
High 14.9% 28.5%
Average Ref.
Low −35.9% 38.2%
General academic skills
High 9.0% 19.3%
Average Ref.
Low −26.5% 33.5%
Innovative/creative skills
High 11.5% 19.4%
Average Ref.
Low −30.7% 34.6%
Strategic/organizational skills
High 11.1% 20.4%
Average Ref.
Low −25.8% 25.3%
Interpersonal skills
High 12.4% 24.8%
Average Ref.
Low −39.1% 39.7%
Commercial/entrepreneurial skills
High 7.3% 33.4%
Average Ref.
Low −32.8% 32.5%
Willingness to pay is assumed to be distributed normally in
the population with mean MeanWTP and standard deviation
SD. For calculation, the difference between the average salary
level coeﬃcient (reference category) and the 10% above aver-
age salary level coeﬃcient (0 − (−0.340) = 0.340) presents a
measure of 10% of the average wage. Using the rule of three,
the mean willingness to pay for a particular attribute level –
in percent of the average salary compared to the reference at-
tribute level – can be calculated by multiplying its coeﬃcient
estimate by 10 and then dividing it by 0.340. The standard
deviations of the willingness to pay are calculated using the
same rule but replacing the mean coeﬃcients with the coeﬃ-
cients of the standard deviations.
29 For scatter plots indicating a concave relationship between productivity
(the mixed logit coeﬃcients) and skill levels see Fig. A1 in Appendix A.of professional expertise, compared to a graduate with aver-
age professional expertise. The standard deviation of 28.5%
indicates that this willingness to pay varies substantially. For
a junior position with an average salary of 30,000 Euro per
year the estimates in Table 5 imply an average premium of
around 4500 Euro per year for a graduate belonging to the
top 25% as opposed to the average group with regard to pro-
fessional expertise.
Employers’ willingness to pay for a graduate with low
professional expertise is negative, indicating that employ-
ers would require compensation for hiring such a graduate.
This compensation amounts to about a third of the aver-
age salary of a junior position. Taking the example of a ju-
nior position with an average salary of 30,000 Euro per year
again, the average employer would require compensation of
10,770 Euro per year for hiring a graduate with a low level
of professional expertise. This amount can be understood in
terms of productivity loss or training costs which have to
be spent in order to improve the graduate’s skills to average
level.
8. Conclusions
In this study we elicit employers’ preferences for a va-
riety of CV attributes and types of skills when recruit-ing recent university graduates. Using two discrete choice
experiments, we are able to show that employers’ selection
of candidates for job interviews is most strongly inﬂuenced
by CV attributes which signal a high stock of occupation-
speciﬁc human capital indicating short adjustment peri-
ods in the job and low training costs. Accordingly, profes-
sional expertise is a type of skill strongly inﬂuencing the
hiring decision, supporting the ﬁndings of previous studies
which point to the importance of occupation-speciﬁc skills
(Elish et al., 2010; Heijke et al., 2003; Mason, 1998, 1999).
However, we also ﬁnd that having good interpersonal skills
is as important for graduates’ employability as having pro-
fessional expertise. The large impact we ﬁnd of interpersonal
skills on graduates’ chances to get hired is in line with earlier
studies emphasizing the increasing importance of communi-
cation in today’s work-life in general, and especially for team
productivity (Autor et al., 2003; Biesma et al., 2007; Felstead
et al., 2007; Kiong-Hock 1986).
Other types of skills and attributes also play a role in the
recruitment process but are less important and can therefore
not easily compensate for a lack of more speciﬁc human cap-
ital and interpersonal skills.
Our ﬁndings can also be interpreted as evidence for a
concave relationship between skills and productivity.29 The
productivity loss associated with hiring a graduate with low
skills is much larger than the beneﬁts of recruiting a high
skilled graduate instead of one with average skills. This sug-
gests that having low skilled workers in the workplace can-
not be compensated for by team members with high skills.
What is more, our ﬁndings suggest that the costs associ-
ated with below average performance are so substantial that
salary is not an adequate adjustment mechanism. Employers
are in general willing to pay average salary for average perfor-
mance but are unwilling to hire underperforming graduates
just because they are cheaper.
The large standard deviations of the estimated mean co-
eﬃcients imply that there is not one graduate proﬁle which
all employers prefer. Rather, employers’ demand for skills
varies substantially. Some employers may not want to re-
cruit the graduates with the highest skill levels because
the job does not require them and they fear that gradu-
ates will get bored too quickly. Other employers, and the
in-depth interviews conﬁrm this, may not have a strong
preference for graduates with high professional expertise be-
cause they have the internal training facilities to teach them
the occupation-speciﬁc knowledge they need. The same em-
ployers may therefore put more emphasis on other, more
transversal types of skills such as general academic skills
because they are an important ingredient for further pro-
fessional growth. Remarkably, background variables, such as
employers’ country, occupational ﬁeld, ﬁrm size or inter-
national market exposure, explain little of the variance in
preferences: the relative importance employers attach to CV
attributes and types of skills does not cluster according to
characteristics often used to describe and categorize them –
the country differences of preferences for master’s degrees
and study experience abroad being exceptions. More detailed
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Fig. A1. Concave relationship between productivity and skill levels. Figure contains scatter plots indicating the concave relationship between productivity (the
mixed logit coeﬃcients) and skill levels by type of skill. The ﬁtted values are based on the prediction for the mixed logit coeﬃcient from a regression of the mixed
logit coeﬃcient on skill level and skill level squared.
Table A1
Comparison of the proportion of graduates working in a particular occu-
pational ﬁeld and respondents in our sample.
Occupational ﬁeld Sample (%) REFLEX/HEGESCO (%)
Electro-technology 6.72 7.64
Engineering 18.66 33.65
Financial Services 17.16 20.83
ICT 19.90 16.21
Legal professionals 15.05 8.07
(continued on next page)information on the particular junior positions employers had
in mind when doing the experiments would be necessary
to further explain the differences in employers’ preferences.
This has important implications for individuals intending
to maximize their employability. When envisaging employ-
ment with a particular employer, graduates need more de-
tailed information on this employer’s preferenceswhenmak-
ing decisions regarding their skill proﬁle. Merely depending
on characteristics such as ﬁrm size or the sector is insuf-
ﬁcient for making optimal choices. In contrast, individuals
who aim to maximize their average chances on the labour
market without having a particular employer inmind do best
by investing in their professional expertise and interpersonal
skills.
The implications of our results for higher education in-
stitutions are similar. Aggregate skill supply should match
aggregate skill demand reasonably well, and some gradu-
ate skill proﬁles need to be developed in higher quantity
than others. Our ﬁndings show that some types of skills
are more important for labour market entry while others
are more important for individuals’ future careers. From
the employer’s perspective, types of skills such as com-
mercial/entrepreneurial skills, innovative/creative skills and
strategic/organizational skills are more important and bet-
ter developed after having acquired a few years of work ex-
perience. This suggests that initial higher education should
focus on the transmission of occupation-speciﬁc knowl-
edge, problem-solving skills, general academic skills and in-
terpersonal skills. Unless it is a central characteristic of a
study programme aligned to the needs of particular em-
ployers, providing individuals with high levels of com-mercial/entrepreneurial skills, innovative/creative skills and
strategic/organizational skills may not be optimal for gradu-
ates’ employability.
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Table A1 (continued)
Occupational ﬁeld Sample (%) REFLEX/HEGESCO (%)
Media and Communication 13.56 4.56
Policy and Organization 8.96 9.03
Note: This table compares the proportion of graduates who have been
found to be working in a particular occupational ﬁeld in the REFLEX and
HEGESCO graduate surveys with the proportion of respondents represent-
ing this occupational ﬁeld in our sample. The comparison has been done
for all countries covered in the present study except Sweden, which is not
represented in the REFLEX and HEGESCO data. As occupations were coded
according to ISCO88 in the REFLEX and HEGESCO surveys, exact match-
ing of graduates from these surveys to the occupational ﬁelds used in
our survey – which are broadly based on ISCO08, is not possible. Some
of the differences in descriptive statistics between the present study and
REFLEX/HEGESCO may therefore be due to correspondence problems be-
tween ISCO88 and the occupational ﬁelds we deﬁned. We code electri-
cal and electronics and telecommunications engineers (ISCO88 2143 and
2144) to Electro-technology. The remaining occupations in the architects,
engineers and related professionals category (ISCO88 214) are considered
to belong to the Engineering occupational ﬁeld. We code accountants and
business professionals to the Financial Services category (ISCO88 214, ex-
cept for personnel and career professionals, ISCO88 2412, who are coded
to Policy and Organization), and computing professionals (ISCO88 213) to
ICT. Writers and creative or performing artists are included in Media and
Communication. This is likely to underestimate the number of media and
communications professionals as public relations jobs, which can be dis-
tinguished in ISCO08 but not ISCO88, cannot be included. Legal profession-
als are easily identiﬁed from ISCO88 262. The Policy and Organization cat-
egory contains personnel and career professionals (ISCO88 2412) aswell as
economists, sociologists and political scientists (ISCO88 2441, 2442, 2443).
These categories represent 72.79% of graduates working in graduates jobs
(ISCO88 2) outside health and education professions.While the proportion
of graduates working in a particular ﬁeld and respondents in our sample
match reasonably well for Electro-technology, Financial Services, ICT and
Policy and Organization, respondents representing the Engineering occu-
pational ﬁeld seem to be under represented, and those of Legal Services
and Media and Communication over represented.
Table A2
Comparison of ﬁrm size by occupational ﬁeld in REFLEX/HEGESCO and our
sample.
Firm size by occupational ﬁeld Sample (%) REFLEX/HEGESCO (%)
Electro-technology
<50 37.21 43.09
50–99 27.91 12.15
100–249 18.60 17.13
>249 16.28 27.62
Engineering
<50 49.33 45.73
50–99 12.00 14.46
100–249 14.00 13.64
>249 24.67 26.17
Financial Services
<50 44.72 43.24
50–99 17.07 14.29
100–249 14.63 17.76
>249 23.58 24.71
(continued)
Table A2 (continued)
Firm size by occupational ﬁeld Sample (%) REFLEX/HEGESCO (%)
ICT
<50 37.88 39.05
50–99 17.42 16.19
100–249 20.45 16.90
>249 24.24 27.86
Legal professionals
<50 36.61 67.20
50–99 13.39 10.58
100–249 15.18 10.05
>249 34.82 12.17
Media and Communication
<50 50.59 67.01
50–99 9.41 6.19
100–249 21.18 12.37
>249 18.82 14.43
Policy and Organization
<50 23.44 44.27
50–99 15.63 13.54
100–249 18.75 14.58
>249 42.19 27.60
Note: ﬁrm size measures in REFLEX/HEGESCO are not strictly compara-
ble to those in our study. While we asked for the number of persons
employed in the ﬁrm in the particular country in the employer survey,
the measure available in REFLEX/HEGESCO is the number of employees at
the location. The comparison of ﬁrm size characteristics suggests that re-
spondents working in small ﬁrms are underrepresented (and respondents
working in large ﬁrms overrepresented) in the occupational ﬁelds Legal
Services and Policy and Organization. For Media and Communication, re-
spondents working in small ﬁrms also seem to be underrepresented, while
those working in ﬁrms with between 100 and 249 employees seem to be
overrepresented in our sample.
Table A3
Changes in choice probabilities associated with changes in CV attribute
levels.
Change in choice probability
Attribute level down Attribute level up
Baseline choice probability: 46.00%
Degree Master’s to bachelor’s Master’s to doctorate
−1.3% −8.2%
Match of ﬁeld of study
and job tasks
Incomplete to
unrelated
Incomplete to
complete
−15.9% 9.9%
Work experience 1 year to none 1 year to 2 years
−12.8% 3.9%
Study experience
abroad
Partly to entirely Partly to none
−3.0% −3.4%
Grades Average to below
average
Average to above
average
−8.8% 4.9%
Prestige of university Average to high
3.5%
(continued on next page)
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Table A3 (continued)
Change in choice probability
Attribute level down Attribute level up
Salary Average to 10% below
average
Average to 10% above
average
−1.6% −10.5%
Note: Choice probabilities calculated on the basis of the individual-level co-
eﬃcients from the mixed logit model presented in Table 2. In the scenario
on which this calculation is based, employers have the choice between two
graduates and the no-choice option. In the baseline model, both graduates
have a master’s degree, a ﬁeld of study which matches the job tasks only in-
completely, 1 year of work experience, partly studied abroad, average grades,
attended a university with average prestige, and would receive the aver-
age salary. Presenting employers with this choice, both graduates would
have a probability of 46% of being invited to the job interview. Eight per-
cent of respondents would choose neither of them because for them, no
graduate’s utility surpasses that of choosing no candidate. The utilities of
graduate 1 and 2 and the none-of-these-option are calculated by insert-
ing the coeﬃcients presented in Table 2 into the logit formula (e.g. P1 =
exp(x1b)/exp(x1b)+exp(x2b)+exp(bn), where P1 is the choice probability of
graduate 1, x1b is the vector of characteristics of graduate 1 multiplied with
the coeﬃcient vector b, x2b is the vector of characteristics of graduate 2mul-
tiplied with the coeﬃcient vector b, and bn is the coeﬃcient of the none-
option dummy). In each choice situation (two for each row in the table),
attributes of the ﬁrst graduate remain unchanged, while one attribute level
of the second graduate is changed up or down. Therefore, graduates always
only differ with regard to the one attribute displayed in the table row.
Table A4
Employers’ preference for master’s degrees across countries.
Variables Coeﬃcient
Master’s degree −0.151∗
(0.081)
Master’s degree × Czech Republic 0.297∗
(0.153)
Master’s degree × France 0.242∗
(0.124)
Master’s degree × Germany 0.392∗∗∗
(0.124)
Master’s degree × Italy 0.011
(0.120)
Master’s degree × Netherlands 0.165
(0.108)
Master’s degree × Poland 0.437∗∗∗
(0.131)
Master’s degree × Spain 0.067
(0.119)
Master’s degree × Sweden 0.182
(0.117)
N 36210
Pseudo R2 0.159
Logit coeﬃcients from a conditional logit model containing
all attributes and their levels. The interaction of master’s de-
gree and the UK is omitted. The main effect of master’s degree
therefore represents the effect in the UK. Standard errors ad-
justed for 903 clusters (individuals) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Log pseudo likelihood = −10527.666.
Table A5
Employers’ preference for study experience abroad: entirely
across countries.
Variables Coeﬃcient
Study abroad: entirely −0.337∗∗∗
(0.089)
Study abroad: entirely × Czech Republic 0.392∗∗∗
(0.128)
(continued)
Table A5 (continued)
Variables Coeﬃcient
Study abroad: entirely × France 0.377∗∗∗
(0.126)
Study abroad: entirely × Germany 0.357∗∗∗
(0.122)
Study abroad: entirely × Italy 0.583∗∗∗
(0.125)
Study abroad: entirely × Netherlands 0.246∗∗
(0.111)
Study abroad: entirely × Poland 0.543∗∗∗
(0.121)
Study abroad: entirely × Spain 0.478∗∗∗
(0.122)
Study abroad: entirely × Sweden 0.199
(0.125)
N 36210
Pseudo R2 0.160
Logit coeﬃcients from a conditional logit model containing
all attributes and their levels. The interaction of study abroad:
entirely and the UK is omitted. Themain effect of study abroad
entirely therefore represents the effect in the UK. Standard
errors adjusted for 903 clusters (individuals) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Log pseudo likelihood =
−10521.229.
Table A6
Changes in choice probabilities associated with changes in skill levels.
Change in choice probability
Average to low Average to high
Baseline choice probability: 48.05%
Professional skills −22.8% 11.7%
General academic
skills
−18.0% 7.4%
Innovative/creative
skills
−20.6% 9.5%
Strategic/
organizational skills
18.6% 9.0%
Interpersonal skills −24.3% 9.8%
Commercial/
entrepreneurial
skills
−22.4% 5.6%
Salary Average to 10% below
average
Average to 10%
above average
−0.5% −8.4%
Note: Choice probabilities calculated on the basis of the individual-level co-
eﬃcients from the mixed logit model presented in Table 2. In the scenario
on which this calculation is based, employers have the choice between two
graduates and the no-choice option. In the baseline model, both graduates
belong to the average group with regard to all types of skills, and would re-
ceive the average salary. Presenting employers with this choice, both grad-
uates would have a probability of 48.05% of getting the job. 3.9% of re-
spondents would choose neither of the two graduates because for them,
no graduate’s utility surpasses that of choosing no candidate. The utilities
of graduate 1 and 2 and the none-of-these-option are calculated by insert-
ing the coeﬃcients presented in Table 4 into the logit formula (e.g. P1 =
exp(x1b)/exp(x1b) + exp(x2b) + exp(bn), where P1 is the choice probability
of graduate 1, x1b is the vector of characteristics of graduate 1 multiplied
with the coeﬃcient vector b, x2b is the vector of characteristics of graduate 2
multiplied with the coeﬃcient vector b, and bn is the coeﬃcient of the none-
option dummy). In each choice situation (two for each row in the table), skill
levels of the ﬁrst graduate remain unchanged, while the level of one skill
type of the second graduate is changed up or down. Therefore, graduates al-
ways only differ with regard to the one type of skill displayed in the table
row.
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